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OREGON LAW REVIEW
principle which has gradually emerged as the correct standard for the "equal
protection" guarantee.
Thus the court, in the principal case, quotes from Patsone v. Pennsyl-
vania.5  "The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. The
demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is sup-
posed to have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the
law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter
of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named."
Does the application of this principle help us in the present instance?
The activities of the Ku Klux Klan are no closed book, in spite of the secret
nature of the organization. Its long and shameful record of outlawry, crime,
defiance of law, intolerance and biggotry constitute one of the darkest chapters
in the history of American institutions. "The question is a practical one."
The law need not be applied equally to all members of the designated class,
for all members are not responsible for the evils which the statute aims to
correct. In this way, persons or objects may be selected from a class to form
what, in fact, constitutes another class, based upon the purpose and object
of the legislation in question. The fact that all but a few or even one member
of the larger designated class are excluded by the selection is no objection.
As said by Mr. Justice Holmes, "it is the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort." 8 But so long as the
sLattite is drafted upon experience which has a reasonable relation to a decent
end and objective, there can be nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn it. -Fowler V. Harper.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE CoMMERace-The state of Louisiana,
by legislative act, declared that the shrimp in the state were to be conserved
for the use of the people of the state; that under certain regulations one might
seeure a license to take the shrimp, to be canned within the state; that after
they were canned they might be shipped out of the state. Prior to the taking
effect of the act X, a Louisiana corporation, had been taking shrimp and
shipping them to Y, a Mississippi corporation, operating a canning factory
in Mississippi. The enforcement of the act would destroy this arrangement,
and make it impossible for 'T to can Louisiana shrimp, except in Louisiana.
X and Y, in the federal court in Louisiana, sought to, enjoin the enforcement
of parts of the act on the theory that they were invalid under the commerce
clause. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decree of the
lower courts which had refused a temporary injunction.1
It seems tc have been conceded that the plaintiffs could not have been
successful had they relied on the 14th amendment. In fact, there is no
dissent in the authorities on that score. The state owns the wild life of the
state for the benefit of its people; one can only then deal with this wild life,
(the property of the state) with the consent of the state. The state may grant
a license to take the game upon such conditions as it sees fit, but the licensee
acquires no property right protected by the "due process clause," for the
5 232 U. S. 138, 144, 58 L. Ed. 539, 34 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
6 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 207, 71 L. Ed. 1000, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1926).
1Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 49 Sup. Ct. 1 (Oct., 1928).
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property which the licensee gets is limited by the terms of the license. 2 The
result under the 14th amendment is exactly the same in the highway cases.
The highways of the state are the property of the state, and any use other
than a public use is subject to license by the proper authorities, upon such
conditions as they care to impose. A proposed, and indeed an actual, user of
the highways for private gain has no property or privilege protected by the
14th amendment.s The so-called "certificate of public necessity" issued to
bus companies is not a "property right." 4 Conversely under the 14th amend-
ment one cannot be compelled to devote his property to any business or com-
merce, except that of his own choice. 5 If the state does in fact devote its
property to interstate commerce it is still entitled to compensation for its use.$
In the present case the court seems to have specifically enforced an in-
choate right to do interstate business. Where no present property right is
involved, the difference in the result under the commerce clause, and that under
the 14th amendment has never been explained by the court. The principal
case adds a third situation to two others recently established. The commerce
clause has heretofore been construed, to affect the jurisdiction of state courts
over a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, although admittedly
the jurisdiction of the state courts would not be affected by; the 14th amend-
ment.7
Within the past few years, too, the Supreme Court has established the
doctrine that a proposed use of a state highway for interstate commerce is
2 State v. Kofines, 33 R. I. 221, 80 Atl. 432, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1120 (1911);
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793 (1896);
Alsos v. Kendall, 111 Or. 359, 227 Pac. 286 (1924); Booth Fisheries Co. v.
Kendall, 111 Or. 377, 227 Poe. 291 (1924). The validity of these Oregon
decisions is not involved in the principal case; but a different result might be
reached were similar situations to arise, and the plaintiff' were to rely on the
commerce clause instead of the 14th amendment.
a Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1923).
4 Roberto v. Commission, (Mass., 1928), 160 N. E. 321.
5 Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct.
191, 69 L. Ed. 445, (1925); Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46
Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101 (1925). (These cases both hold that a private
carrier cannot be compelled to become a common carrier.)
6 City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tele. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 13 Sup. Ct.
485, 37 L. Ed. 380 (1892). (City had granted license to use streets, but could
collect rent for their use.)
7 One cannot sue upon a cause of action arising, in another state, where
both parties are non-residents, and the carrier is in fact inconvenienced. Davis
v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed.
996 (1923); Iron City Produce Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., (Ohio State,
App. Ct., 1927), 151 N. E. 316, 3 IND. L. J. 130; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope,
235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193 (1914). (State compelled to
provide reasonable court facilities for the enforcement against one of its citi-
zens of a cause of action arising out of interstate commerce). Cf. Conneley
v. Central R. R. Co., 238 Fed. 932 (1916); Murman v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221
N. Y. Supp. 332 (1927). (In the last two cases the cause of action arose under
the Federal Employee's Liability Act, and the result is different, due to the
fact that the act provides that suit "may be brought in any district where the
defendant shall be doing business.")
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protected by the commerce clause. 8 It was assumed in the first case decided 9
that the 14th amendment was no protection. The theory was that to refuse
an applicant a license for the use of the state highways after others had
been granted licenses was a prohibition of competition in interstate commerce,
and consequently not a regulation of the use of the highways, but a regulation
of interstate commerce. The result is that prohibition of competition in
intrastate commerce is a regulation of the use of the highways and not a
regulation of business, (and valid under the 14th amendment), while pro-
hibition of the use of highways in interstate commerce, is not a prohibition of
the use, but of competition under the commerce clause. Thus, an inchoate
right to engage in interstate commerce is protected by the commerce clause of
the Constitution; an inchoate right to engage in intrastate commerce is not
protected by the 14th amendment.
The principal case does not discuss the bus eases, but the principle in-
volved and the result reached are the same.
The court in the shrimp ease relied upon the following propositions:
1. The recited reasons for, and purposes of, the act were false, i. e., there was
no purpose to conserve any part of the shrimp for domestic use, but to compel
the establishment of canning factories in the state (and it decides that this
latter purpose was invalid). 2. Conditions in Louisiana were not as favorable
as were conditions in Mississippi for canning shrimp. 3. The offer to allow
the shrimp to be caught for the ultimate purpose of interstate commerce
placed the shrimp in interstate commerce when in fact caught, and other regu-
lations were therefore invalid. 4. The taking of shrimp under the act would
create a private ownership; the plaintiffs could accept the offer without being
bound by the remaining regulations which were invalid, because in conflict
with the commerce clause.
The opinion is not clear as to which propositions really form the basis
of the decision. If the third is the decisive one, then the first and second are
immaterial, i. e., if the shrimp were in fact put into interstate commerce
then clearly all state control ceased, and any state prohibition of interstate
commerce would be invalid if it were supported by the best of reasons, and
the purest of motives or purposes. That they were not yet put in interstate
commerce appears plain.lo There was only an offer to put them in interstate
commerce under certain conditions. The plaintiffs were not complaining that
they already had taken shrimp which they were prohibited from using in inter.
8 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623(1925) ; Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 327, 69 L. Ed.
627 (1925); 21 ILL. L. REv. 559. If the motor transportation is in fact law-
fully established the proper authorities may exact pay for the privilege
granted, and make reasonable regulations as to the use of the highways;
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 48 Sup. Ct. 230, 72 L Ed.
243 (1928); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co., 273 U. S. 45,
47 Sup. Ct. 298, 71 L. Ed. 530 (1927); American Motor Coach System v.
City, 28 Fed. (2) 736 (1928); Sprout v. City, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 277 U. S. 163, 72
L. Ed. 529 (1928), (license fee must not be a tax on the privilege to do inter-
state business.. See 12 MINN. L. REv. 321, 470, 607.
9 Buck v. Kuykendall, supra, note 8.
10 Cf. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 22 Fed. (2) 122
(1927). (Federal Trade Commission has no jurisdiction over the sugar indus-
try so long as the acts complained of have to do solely with production and
manufacture.)
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state commerce; they were complaining that they could not take shrimp to be
subsequently used in interstate commerce.
In this connection the court seems to lay some emphasis on the fact that
the plaintiffs heretofore had been engaged in interstate commerce. This, it
is submitted, is immaterial. Clearly the mere withdrawal of the state's
property from interstate commerce, or the refusal to grant or renew a license
to take the shrimp for purposes of interstate commerce would not be regula-
tion of interstate commerce. It would be clearly going too far to hold that
the inchoate right to engage in interstate commerce created a corresponding
duty on the par of anyone the plaintiff might wish to contract with, which
would be specifically enforced. If the defendant in fact wished to devote its
property to intrastate commerce, would not forcing it to devote it to interstate
cominmerce be unconstitutional, as a federal interference with a state power?
And why, after all, is not that a complete answer to the court's decision?
If the state sees fit to devote its property exclusively to intrastate com-
merce, is not that within its admitted powers? Can there be any regulation
of interstate commerce until interstate commerce is in fact lawfully estab-
lished? How can the mere making of an offer be an interference with inter-
state commerce?
The fourth proposition is the one upon which the court must rest its
decision, and the first and second are then material in determining the validity
of the conditions. The result is that if the state in truth makes an offer to
use its shrimp in interstate commerce, upon a condition that the shrimp must
first be canned in the state, one may accept the offer without the condition,
the latter being invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce." The surpris-
ing result is that the righb or privilege to do interstate business is not such
a right or privilege as is protected by the 14th amendment, but it is, neverthe-
less, a property right when measured by the commerce clause. If the condition
against use in interstate commerce is invalid, then the property the taker
gets ought clearly to be such a property as is protected by the 14th amend-
ment. It seems plain, does it not, that after all the federal courts ought not
to, and in fact cannot specifically enforce the inchoate right to do interstate
business? The right to do interstate business can be no better than the right
to do intrastate business :the first is governed by the commerce clause, but to
no greater extent than is the latter by the reserved power of the state.
The right or privilege to engage in interstate commerce is no different
from the right or privilege to engage in any other business, except that the
source of its control is federal. That suggests a question not discussed in
the principal case: was there a "case" presented within Section 2, Article 111,
U. S. Constitution? The suit was to enjoin the enforcement of the parts of
the act which the plaintiffs claimed were in conflict with the commerce clause.
There was no allegation that they had accepted or attempted to accept the
offer, the state had made. The result sought, and in truth, the relief obtained
is a declaration that the conditions in restraint of interstate commerce were
11 As far as the 14th amendment is concerned, the result is the direct
opposite: the offer is an offer to grant a qualified interest in the shrimp, and
the limited restraint as to its use is valid; i. e., the state has a right to grant
or not, as it sees fit, and it may therefore grant upon such terms and condi-
tions as it desires, and it may grant only a qualified interest.
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invalid, and that the plaintiffs might accept the offer of the state without
aceeping the invalid conditions. It looks as if the decree were a declaratory
one, and that no "property right" was involved.12
On that theory the suit was prematurely brought. Had the plaintiff
accepted the offer of the state, applied for a license, and started to take
shrimp the questions involved could have been properly raised, and it is sub-
mitted that the same result would be reached, but it ought to be reached
under a combination of both the commerce clause and the 14th amendment.
The Constitution gives a right or privilege to do interstate business: this
right or privilege if it exists and is recognized ought to be property pro-
tected by the 14th amendment. The result of that is of course (if the existence
of the right or privilege be decreed) that the Supreme Court merely erroneously
assumed that the 14th amendment was not involved. The result of the cases
would be the same. The question would then be, is this a reasonable regulation
under all of the circumstancest Geer v. Connecticut, and the principal ease
could then be reconciled.
The court's fourth proposition above involves two questions: 1. Is the
condition attached to the offer in truth illegal? and, 2. If illegal, is it separ-
able from the balance of thel offer? The decision on the first is in conflict
with the prior case of Geer v. State of Connec,tint.18 In that case the state
had prohibited the taking of certain game birds except for domestic use. In
a criminal prosecution under the act the defendant urged that the act was
in conflict with the commerce clause. The court in that case decided that the
offer of the state to the defendant to take the game upon certain conditions
could not be split up, i. e., he took his hunting license with those conditions
attached; that the condition against transportation out of the state was
valid, because the defendant had no rights until he took the game, and he
got thereby only a qualified ownership.14 (The result was that the defendant
had no right to do interstate business which was not co-extensive with his
rights under the 14th amendment. On this point the eases are clearly in
12 Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1910);
Penn. v. W. Va., 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 32 A. L. R. 300
(1922). It is true that courts recognize the privilege of engaging in business
as a property right and restrain an interference with the privilege; but no
court has yet reformed an offer to sell to conform to the desire of the offeree.
The net result of this case is that the court makes an offer for the defendant.
It may be suggested that the explanation, however, is that the state was acting
in two capacities; in making the offer of a grant of a license it was acting in
its proprietary capacity as trustee of the shrimp, while in making the' restric-
tions as to its use it was acting in its governmental capacity and in the exer-
cise of its "police powers." The proposed business then between the plaintiffs
and the state, as trustee, was protected as against the threatened interference
by the state, as state. The answer to that would seem to be that in truth
the statute in question was not an offer plus a regulation, but it was only a
conditional offer. This argument has been repudiated in the cases under the
14th amendment. See, Geer v. Connecticut, supra, note 2.
is Supra, note 2.
14 "The power of the state to control the killing of and ownership in
game being admitted, the commerce in game, which the state law permitted,
was necessarily only internal commerce, since the restriction that it should
not become the subject of external commerce, went along with the grant and
was a part of it." 161 U. S. at p. 532.
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conflict.) The court, in the Geer case, however, decided also that admitting
that the conditions attached to the license did affect interstate commerce the
regulation was a valid state exercise of the police power. Upon that point
there would seem to be much force to the observation of Mr. Justice ge-
Reynolds in the dissenting opinion in the principal case: "How wild life may
be utilized in order to advantage her own citizens is for the producing state
to determine. To enlarge opportunity for employment is one way, and often
the most effective way to promote this welfare." 15
On the proposition that the illegal condition in restraint is separable
from the balance of the offer the court cites three cases,'s each of which
involved the right of a foreign corporation to object to laws in force at the
time of its admission to a state on the ground that their enforcement violated
the "equal protection" clause. The reason must be that the 14th amendment is
a limitation upon the power of the state to act; the corporation does not accept
thei supposed conditions on its entry into the state because the state has no
power to make that kind of an offer.17 The commerce clause is likewise a
limitation on the power of a state to act, and the result is (if it be decided
that the condition is in fact a restraint on interstate commerce) that the
condition is invalid, being beyond the power of the state to offer, and there-
fore of the offeree to accept.
The result in the instant case would be, then-(if the plaintiffs had
accepted the offer and started to take the shrimp)-that by accepting the
offer the plaintiffs acquired a property right in the shrimp when taken. The
interference by the state in an effort to take the shrimp out of the state would
be invalid under the 14th amendment, and the supposed excuse for the inter-
ference would be a condition, invalid under the commerce clause. The present
decision could well be justified under such a situation, whereas upon the record
the decision seems to be a declaratory decree, and in effect the specific enforce-
ment of an inchoate right to do interstate business.
Would the result be any different if the offer were made by an individual
rather than the state? The prohibition of the 14th amendment is solely
against state action, so clearly it could not apply.19 It is difficult to see how
the result would be any different under the commerce clause. It granted to
Congress, and thereby took from the states, power to regulate interstate com-
merce. An individual might interfere with interstate commerce, and his act
might be unlawful under appropriate legislation, but it would not be uncon-
25 49 Sup. Ct. at p. 5. See also, Union Fisheries Co. v. Shoemaker, 98 Or.
658, 193 Pac. 476, 394 Pac. 854 (1921) and New York ex rel Silz v. Hester-
burg, 211 U. S. 31 (1908).
15 Quaker City Cab. Co. v. Pa., 278 U. S., 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed.
607 (1928); Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 47 L. Ed. 678, 71 L. Ed.
1165 (1926); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179, 71
L. Ed. 372, 49 A. L. R. 713 (1926).
17 An individual may of course waive his constitutional rights, and indi-
viduals may contract away their constitutional rights. Hunter v. Colfax Consol
Coal Co., 175 Ia. 245, 154 N. W. 1037, Ann. Cas. 1917E 803, L. R. A. 1917D
15 (1915).
is Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U. S. 414, 47 Sup. Ct. 363, 71 L. Ed.
714 (1926).
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stitutional.19 Congress might pass an act making all conditions in restraint
of interstate commerce invalid; the result would be that the offeree might
accept the offer and disregard the conditions. A state could not refuse to
enforce his rights under the contract, not because it must enforce his inchoate
right to do interstate business, but because his contract rights are property
within the 14th amendment, and the supposed conditions do not limit them,
being invalid under the federal legislation. If the state makes the offer with
conditions attached in restraint of interstate commerce the conditions are
void, being beyond its power to make; if an individual is the offeror, the
conditions might be void under appropriate federal legislation, not because
of a lack of power to make that kind of an offer, but because the conditions
wonld be illegal. -Bernard C. Gavit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REASONAHLE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER-In
any application of the constitutional requirement that a taking of private
property by the state be a reasonable taking we are necessarily dealing in
mental concepts. As to whether or not given action is reasonable depends
ultimately upon the judges' ideas of reasonableness which in turn depend
upon the experience, learning and philosophy of the judges themselves. In the
recent ease of Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,' the majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States say: "Mere stock ownership in a corporation,
owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substantial relation
to the public health,-the act creates an unreasonable and unnecessary re-
striction upon private business." The minority say: "A standing criticism
of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such business to be
owned by people who do not know anything about it.-The divorce between
the power of control and knowledge is an evil.-It is enough if the questioned
act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less."
Other language of the opinions would indicate that perhaps the difference
in result may be that the majority requires reasonable evidence to support
the reasonableness of the regulation: the minority requires only a scintilla
of evidence. This would be a departure from the accepted rules that one who
attacks an act as unconstitutional has the burden of proof, and that all
reasonable presumptions are in favor of the action of the state. But if the
point were specifically raised both sides would undoubtedly pay lip-service
to these rules. The majority opinion is really upon the theory that acting
itpon judicial knowledge and the evidence in thei case there was no evidence
to sustain the reasonableness of the legislation.
A regulation of private property must have in truth a reasonable founda-
tion. The rights of private property are protected by the Constitution against
every unreasonable taking even although the taking be under the guise of
social welfare. Where a private right leaves off and social welfare begins
depend in truth on the length and breadth of the so-colled private right.
lt For example, in the Bedford Stone Company ease the basis of the plain-
tiff's action was an alleged violation of the Federal Anti-Trust Law. Bedford
Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Assoc., 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522,
71 L. Ed. 916 (1927). See also, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S.
211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 130 (1899); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
U. S., 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L. Ed. 107 (1912).
1 73 L. Ed. 45, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928). The facts are stated, post, p. 295.
